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Introduction 
To get food on your plate three times a day takes the contribution of a whole 
sequence of firms. Consecutively, there are producers of inputs like seeds and 
fertilisers, there are farmers, processing firms and logistic services providers, 
there are wholesalers and retailers. Together they make up a typical supply 
chain in the agrifood business. A supply chain (or chain for short) is a sequence 
of firms, involved in successive production activities. These firms are linked 
by streams of (intermediary) products, information and money. The core of 
the supply chain is the product flow. To quote some common definitions: 'A 
supply chain is a network of organisations that are involved through 
upstream and downstream linkages in different processes and activities that 
produce value in the form of products and services in the hands of the ulti-
mate consumer' (Christopher, 1998), or alternatively: 'A supply chain is a sys-
tem whose constituent parts include material suppliers, production facili-
ties, distribution services and customers, linked together via the feed-forward 
flow of materials and the feedback flow of information and financial capital' 
(Stevens, 1989). 
In many supply chains, a progressing division of labour facilitated by the 
application of ICT (information and communication technologies) and other 
new technologies has lead to a gradual de-coupling of the information and 
financial flows from the product stream. Separate organizations have 
become involved in the transfer of information and money. This develop-
ment has transformed the chain into a network. A network thus consists of a 
chain, a sequence of organizations centred round a product stream, together 
with the supporting organizations that deal with the information and finan-
cial flows. In this chapter, I shall stick to the term chain to mean both the tra-
ditional chain and the chain extended into a network. 
This chapter looks into the nature of chain relationships, mainly based upon 
insights from institutional economics. Firms in a chain all have their specific 
objectives and interests. Particularly, commercial organizations each tend to 
maximise their own profits. Improvement of chain performance as a whole 
may come into conflict with this tendency. Attempts to increase aggregate 
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chain profits are often hampered by issues concerning the distribution of 
these profits. A central issue in chain development is therefore to align inter-
ests of the various actors in a chain where possible, and to design co-ordina-
tion mechanisms to deal with conflicts of interests. 
Basically, chain collaboration is a matter of finding organizational modes for 
vertical relationships (i.e. relationships between a supplier and a buyer in a 
chain). We shall proceed as follows. The starting point for our analysis is a ver-
tical relationship between two firms without organizational integration: 
exchange between firms as it is organised through spot markets (markets 
where goods are bought and sold for cash and delivered immediately). I shall 
consider the particular problems this poses in terms of lost opportunities 
and efficiency losses by looking at market failures. Then, I shall present the 
two main routes of escape from market failure as they develop in commercial 
relationships. We look at advantages and weaknesses and at the costs and 
benefits of the different mechanisms. 
The market mechanism as an institution 
If people or organizations meet as independent actors to exchange some-
thing in return for something else (often money), we call this a market. Mar-
ket exchange is the transfer of property rights from one actor to another. An 
important characteristic is the independence of the actors: they are free to 
exchange and have no authority over each other. A market exchange mecha-
nism induces actors to demand as much as possible, in return for as little as 
possible. Under certain assumptions, like decreasing marginal utility (i.e. the 
utility to you of every next piece of an item you obtain is less), markets tend 
to an equilibrium, a situation where those actors that are willing to exchange 
do so against a specific price. This equilibrium is a welfare optimum in the 
sense that all agents that engage in exchange benefit from this exchange, 
and all opportunities to benefit from exchange are being exploited. 
The market is an example of an economic institution. Institutions are the for-
mal and informal rules and mechanisms that govern exchange (Hazeu, 
2000). They are co-ordination mechanisms, social technologies, routines that 
people and organizations employ both to compete and to co-operate with 
each other and to transfer things (Nelson and Sampat, 2001). Institutions are 
'the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, the humanly devised 
constraints that shape human interaction. In consequence they structure 
incentives in human exchange, whether political, social, or economic' 
(North, 1990). 
An institution offers a solution to a co-ordination problem. Individuals face 
a co-ordination problem, if they all decide individually on their actions while 
34 
CO-ORDINATION MECHANISMS IN CHAINS AND NETWORKS 
their payoffs depend also on the decisions of other individuals and not only 
on their own decisions. Institutions limit the set of permitted actions and 
outcomes. They restrict behaviour by laying down some 'do's and don'ts', by 
requiring or precluding certain actions in specific situations. This makes life 
more predictable, enables individuals to co-ordinate their behaviour and 
allows for planning. Rules are accompanied by enforcement mechanisms. If 
someone deviates, sanctions are imposed on the deviator. Often, institutions 
are backed up by moral values: abiding by the rules meets with approval and 
breaching them with disapproval. Institutions may be formal (laws, con-
tracts), but also informal (social norms). 
Institutions have developed to overcome problems of incomplete informa-
tion and information asymmetries. People are 'boundedly rational', which 
means that they have limited capacities to gather, process and evaluate infor-
mation. Particularly, they have only restricted knowledge of what other 
agents may do in the future. Also, people may be opportunistic, in the sense of 
acting selfishly, disregarding any other interests except their own. Bounded 
rationality together with the suspicion of opportunism on the part of other 
people stifles human interaction and exchange. For example, if you are not 
sure that what you paid for will be delivered, and you suspect your trading 
partner might exploit the situation, you will be cautious and not enter into 
any deal. Institutions curb the possibilities for such opportunistic behaviour 
by a mix of rules, rewards and punishments and thereby generate informa-
tion about the probable future actions of other agents. In this way they com-
pensate for bounded rationality. 
The market is an economic institution in the sense that it regulates exchange 
of property. To function properly and to rule out opportunistic behaviour, 
the market requires all kinds of preconditions to be fulfilled. These precondi-
tions mainly have to do with two things: rights and information. Rights may 
be property rights, decision rights and entitlements to benefits. For instance, 
property must be recognised and protected, contracts must be enforceable, 
the value of money must be trustworthy, conditions of sale must be unambig-
uous. Thus, the market is a mechanism that functions thanks to all sorts of 
laws, regulations and support organizations that serve to protect different 
kinds of rights. The rule that you can only sell what is yours or that you 
should in some markets publicly announce prices are examples of laws and 
regulations; a court that handles disputes is a support organization to 
enforce the law. 
The market has to be able to generate the necessary information in order for 
the market mechanism to generate benefits for all, i.e. the market has to be 
transparent. All actors on the market must have access to all relevant infor-
mation. If some agents are able to restrict information and if information is 
therefore asymmetrically distributed (as is often the case, for instance if the 
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seller knows better what is being traded than the buyer), this opens up the 
possibility for opportunistic behaviour and hampers the accomplishment of 
mutually beneficial exchange. 
Protecting rights and generating the required information for the market to 
function properly requires effort and therefore entails costs. These costs, that 
have to be made to make an institution like the market operate, are called 
transaction costs. There are ex ante transaction costs that pertain to gathering 
relevant information on transaction opportunities (search costs), to evaluat-
ing alternatives, bargaining, negotiating a contract. There are ex post transac-
tion costs related to monitoring and enforcing a contract and protecting 
property rights. 
3 Two sources of market failure 
Consider firms that exchange products on spot markets. These are not bound 
to their trading partners for any prolonged period; they are flexible and inde-
pendent. They each bear part of the transaction costs that make the market 
function: costs of searching, bargaining and enforcement. Under specific 
conditions, the spot market may be the lowest cost institutional mechanism 
available for the firm to pursue its objectives. There are, however, some cir-
cumstances where the market fails as an effective and efficient co-ordination 
mechanism. Often this is the case when the transaction costs necessary to 
make the market function rise to very high levels. Two sources of market fail-
ure are relevant in the present context: asset specificity and asymmetric 
information. We consider each in turn. 
3.1 Asset specificity 
Suppose a firm acquires or develops special types of machinery or expertise 
upon the requirements of a firm down the chain. An example might be a 
food-processing firm that is required to invest in dedicated packaging 
machines that pack its products according to the specifications of a retailer. 
Assets like this only have a value in the context of a specific supplier-buyer-
relationship: they are relation-specific assets. Asset-specificity, the requirement 
to invest in relation-specific assets, may lead to allocative inefficiency: an 
investment that is in principle beneficial to both parties does not happen. 
Investments in relation-specific assets are sunk, in the sense that they are 
irrecoverable once made. If a contract between two trading partners requires 
one of them to invest in relation-specific assets and if contracts are incom-
plete, in the sense that they do not specify all future contingencies, then the 
investing partner can become the hostage of the other partner. Once the 
investment in the relation-specific asset has been made, the bargaining posi-
tion of the investing party has weakened because the asset cannot be put to 
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alternative use without substantial losses. He may therefore be vulnerable to 
opportunistic behaviour of the other party. As this situation is foreseen by 
the investing party before any deal is concluded, this party will not enter into 
such a deal. This is called the hold-up problem. Deals that are in principle ben-
eficial for both parties are not concluded for lack of a credible mechanism to 
preclude opportunistic behaviour once the investment has been made (or 
alternatively, for lack of a credible commitment that parties will stick to the 
initial agreement). 
A well-known example of the hold-up problem is the situation faced by farm-
ers that decide upon investing in cattle for dairy production. Once the cows 
produce milk, the output must be sold at once as milk quickly spoils. Usually, 
because of scale economies, there is only one milk factory in the vicinity. 
Even if there are more, there is no time to bargain with alternative buyers 
because milk must be sold while fresh. In this situation, the farmer is at the 
mercy of the milk factory. The threat of exploitation by the milk factory may 
prevent the farmer to invest in dairy cattle. Asset specificity is in fact a situa-
tion where specific rights, in this case: entitlements to the benefit of invest-
ments, cannot be protected, at least not with any credibility within the con-
text of the market. If a complete contract could be drawn up ex ante and 
enforced ex post, then the problem could be solved. This, however, would be 
prohibitively expensive. 
3.2 Asymmetric information 
Even without investments in relation-specific assets being involved, uncer-
tainty about the characteristics of traded products and of the future behav-
iour of trading partners can lead to allocative inefficiencies. Consider the sit-
uation where the quality characteristics of products cannot be fully 
perceived and evaluated by a buyer. For example, you may look at, feel and 
smell the melon while it is in the shop, but you will only know the taste by 
the time it is on your table. Suppose higher quality has a higher value in the 
market, but is produced against higher costs. Buyers will be unwilling to pay 
the price of a top quality product if, because of imperfect information and 
the possibility of opportunistic behaviour, there is a probability that they 
will end up with a low quality product. In response, sellers will withdraw the 
high quality product from the market if it cannot fetch the required high 
price that allows them to recoup production costs. Therefore the high quality 
product is withdrawn from the market, despite the fact that there are buyers 
that would be willing to pay the required price. This is the problem of ad verse 
sélection. 
Besides adverse selection, which is an ex ante problem that occurs before deals 
are concluded, there is another uncertainty related problem, the moral hazard 
problem. This occurs ex post, after deals have been concluded. Suppose that 
37 
T H E E M E R G I N G W O R L D O F C H A I N S A N D N E T W O R K S 
the effort level of a producer of a product is imperfectly observable by the 
buyer. This is common in the case of agricultural production, where uncer-
tainty about production volumes, delivery times and quality characteristics 
arise from the fact that production is influenced by autonomous and unpre-
dictable factors like wheather conditions and the occurrence of pests and dis-
eases that influence harvests. After a deal is struck, a seller has an incentive 
to put in less effort than originally agreed. A buyer, anticipating on the pos-
sibility of this sort of opportunism, will be unwilling to enter into a deal, 
thereby again leaving mutually profitable trading possibilities unexploited. 
A solution could be the generation of the information that would permit the 
buyer to adequately judge product quality. This is often very expensive, 
though. 
4 Two alternative mechanisms 
Problems of protection of rights or of transparency may lead to failure of the 
market as an institutional mechanism, in the sense that mutually beneficial 
business deals do not come about or transaction costs rise to prohibitive lev-
els. If the market fails, then other institutional mechanisms are called for 
that can cope with the circumstances that give rise to this specific type of 
market failure. This takes the form of some degree of vertical co-ordination. 
Vertical co-ordination usually combines elements of two other co-ordination 
mechanisms that facilitate exchange. Both imply more management of the 
supplier-buyer relationship, of chain integration, and therefore less inde-
pendence and flexibility. 
4.1 The hierarchical mechanism 
Under specific circumstances, exchange is best organised through the opera-
tion of hierarchies. A hierarchical relationship is an exchange relationship 
where one actor can determine ex post, after the relationship has been con-
cluded, what the other will do, over a certain period of time and within cer-
tain contractual constraints, in exchange for some price that has been con-
cluded ex ante. This price can be for instance a contract price, a salary (in the 
case of labour) or a share in profits (e.g. in the case of a joint venture). Thus, 
one actor transfers authority over his activities to another. Where in market 
exchange an agent sells an output, a hierarchical exchange situation results 
from an agent selling his productive capacity as an input to a value creating 
process of somebody else. Once a hierarchical relationship has been con-
cluded, people or organizations do not meet each other as autonomous 
actors, like in the market, but in a situation where one has authority over the 
other: there is a principal and an agent. 
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An example of a hierarchical arrangement is the milk co-operative. This pro-
ducer co-operative has developed because farmers deciding upon invest-
ments in livestock found themselves faced with a hold-up problem, as 
described above. A milk co-operative processes raw milk into consumer prod-
ucts and is wholly owned by the farmers that produce the milk. Because the 
farmers are entitled to decide upon the policy of the cooperative, the latter 
will work in their common interest and pay an acceptable price for raw milk. 
The establishment of a producer co-operative removes the threat of exploita-
tion and thereby resolves the hold-up problem, the conflicts of interest 
between upstream producers and processors that impedes investment. This 
is an example of substitution of hierarchy for market, of vertical co-ordina-
tion for competition. Though it creates certainty and economic security for 
upstream producers, it limits flexibility and introduces rigidities. 
Institutional mechanisms perform their function at a certain cost - this 
holds for hierarchies as well as markets. In a hierarchical relationship, the 
principal has contracted the agent to pursue the principal's objectives. How-
ever, once the contract is concluded, the agent has an incentive to pursue his 
own objectives, to the disadvantage of the principal. As the principal is 
imperfectly informed about the activities of the agent, the latter can spend 
part of the time sold to the principal for his own benefit. So, like in the case 
of markets, a main factor hampering the exchange mechanism is asymmet-
ric information and the occasion rising from it for opportunism. Costs of the 
mechanism, known as agency costs, are made to overcome this information 
asymmetry and tendency toward opportunistic behaviour. Part of them are 
made by the principal for gathering information (monitoring the activities 
of the agent) and for aligning objectives of principal and agent by creating 
incentives for the agent to work for the benefit of the principal. Another part 
is borne by the agent who invests in bonding, in building a reputation to earn 
the confidence of the principal. 
4.2 The reciprocal mechanism 
Alternatively, co-ordination of exchange can be governed by informal norms. 
Norm based mechanisms of interaction are typical of social networks. The 
reciprocal mechanism, or social network, is 'a separate, different mode of 
exchange, one with its own logic' (Powell, 1990), not a half way house 
between market and hierarchy (see also table 1). Informal norms guide the 
behaviour of groups of actors that entertain long-term relationships, for 
instance within the family, between neighbours, between friends, between 
close colleagues or in a business community. Exchange here frequently takes 
the form of doing something for somebody else, in exchange for the implicit 
reassurance that, should opportunity or necessity arise in the future, they 
will return the favour. Norms that govern this behaviour specify what can be 
expected within certain specific relationships; they pertain for instance to 
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helpfulness, hospitality, expected contributions to the common good of the 
family, the work place, the neighbourhood, et cetera. Norms direct exchange 
within a relationship where the return is as yet unspecified. Typically, it is 
not yet certain whether the occasion will occur where the favour should be 
returned, what the return favour will actually be, and often, who exactly will 
deliver the return. 
Social norms are rules of behaviour, based upon shared values like fairness, 
honesty, respect. They call for virtuous behaviour in exchange relationships. 
They govern not so much exchange between one actor and another, but 
rather, and maybe primarily, between one actor and the other members of a 
group or of society. An actor abides by the norm, in exchange for other actors 
sticking to the norm; this makes norms common and characteristic of spe-
cific networks. Many norms are general rules of behaviour about what is to 
be expected of others in certain situations, embedded in culture. However, 
norms can also be relation or network specific as they develop as rules of 
behaviour particular to a small group. 
Norms often serve to avoid negative side effects of behaviour (also called neg-
ative externalities; e.g. the norm to keep quiet so as not to disturb the neigh-
bours), to provide public goods (e.g. the norm to shovel snow in front of one's 
own house), and to provide security (e.g. the norm to help people in case of 
accidents on the street). Though norms may be informal, they can nonethe-
less be forceful means to guide behaviour. They reduce uncertainty by pre-
cluding opportunistic behaviour. As this mechanism organizes exchange of 
something now in return for something later, information is always asym-
metric: the agent on the receiving end knows what he gets, but the one on 
the giving end is uncertain whether the favour will ever be returned. Norms, 
and the implied repercussions if they are transgressed, offer a reassurance 
that the return favour will indeed be delivered when occasion or need arises. 
The force of the norm and the degree of certainty it offers depends upon the 
gravity of the consequences of transgressing the norm. 
As is the case with the two other mechanisms, there are costs attached to the 
reciprocal mechanism. First, it takes an investment in time and effort in com-
munity building and in the development of personal relationships. Secondly, 
norms curtail freedom and reduce flexibility. They preclude all kinds of self-
interested behaviour and impose group solidarity. Finally, norms only work 
as long as transgressing them leads to some form of punishment. As a rule, 
punishment entails a cost not only to the receiving party. 
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Table l Stylised comparison of co-ordination mechanisms 
Forms 
Key features 
Normative basis 
Incentives 
Means of communica-
tion 
Methods of conflict 
resolution 
Degree of flexibility 
Amount of commitment 
among the parties 
Tone or climate 
Actor preferences or 
choices 
Market 
Contract - property right 
Prices 
Prices 
Haggling-resort to 
courts 
High 
Low 
Precision and/or 
suspicion 
Independent 
Hierarchy 
Employment relation-
ship 
Authority 
Routines 
Administrative fiat 
Low 
Medium to high 
Formal, bureaucratic 
Dependent 
Social network 
Complementary 
strengths 
Norms 
Relational 
Norm of reciprocity -
reputational concerns 
Medium 
Medium to high 
Open-ended, mutual 
benefits 
Interdependent 
After Powell, 1990 
Costs and trade-offs 
The spot market does not require a lot of management of buyer-supplier rela-
tionships. Under certain conditions, though, the market fails to deliver effi-
cient exchange or would do so only against very high transaction costs. In 
that case, exchange requires some degree of vertical co-ordination, the develop-
ment of a tighter vertical relationship. This can be through some form of 
hierarchical control or on the basis of some co-operative agreement. The 
former is usually organised through a formal contract whereas the latter 
functions on the basis of mutual understanding, informal norms of conduct 
and trust. 
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Table 2 
Form 
Strengths 
Mechanisms of vertical co 
Market 
Spot market transactions, 
competition 
Information dissemination, 
incentives, specialisation, 
experimentation, individual 
freedom 
Weaknesses Rent-seeking, commitment, 
Costs 
profit distribution 
Transaction costs: 
• searching; 
• bargaining; 
• enforcing. 
-ordination: strengths, wej 
Hierarchy 
Long term contracts, sub-
contracting, vertical integra-
tion 
Enforcement, certainty 
Incentives, rent-seeking, 
individual freedom 
Agency costs: 
• monitoring; 
• incentive alignment; 
• bonding; 
• dead-weight losses. 
iknesses, costs 
Social network 
Strategic alliances, joint 
ventures 
Motivation, commitment, 
information exchange, 
mutual learning, internal 
flexibility 
Enforceability, free riding, 
abuse, external rigidity 
Networking costs: 
networking; 
• co-operating, helping; 
• retaliating. 
Partly based upon CPB, 1997 
Now consider the advantages and disadvantages of the three mechanisms 
(see table 2). A transparent market condenses and conveys information in the 
form of price signals and provides incentives to compete on the basis of effi-
ciency. Under the right conditions, this achieves efficient allocation. It allows 
agents maximum freedom and flexibility and it stimulates innovation. How-
ever, the time profile of trading in a market is short and commitment is 
therefore low. In the market, agents decide on the basis of self-interest. Under 
specific circumstances, notably high entry barriers, this is likely to lead to 
the exploitation of market power and rent seeking (trying to secure privileges 
from public policy) and thereby to a very skewed distribution of income or 
profits. Under conditions of asset specificity and information asymmetries, 
it leads to prohibitively high transaction costs and beneficial deals not com-
ing about. 
The time profile of a hierarchical arrangement is much longer than that of a 
market transaction: a contract has duration. Therefore, hierarchy offers sta-
bility and certainty. Once the contracts have been concluded, the distribu-
tion of authority is clear and there is no need for further searching and bar-
gaining. This stability and certainty come at a cost, though. In a hierarchical 
relationship, the agent has an incentive to shirk, to let his own interests pre-
vail over those of the principal. Therefore monitoring and incentive align-
ment are required which lead to compliance costs. 
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A network relationship is an implicit agreement, a set of contingent mutual 
promises based upon shared values and norms of behaviour. The time profile 
of a reciprocal network relationship is indeterminate and the individual ben-
efits an agent may reap are uncertain. The advantages of social networks are 
in the commitment they generate and the security this provides in condi-
tions of uncertainty or lack of information. Reciprocal network relationships 
are internally flexible, in the sense that implicit agreements easily adjust to 
changing circumstances, and they facilitate mutual learning and develop-
ment. Reciprocal relationships, though, are only as reliable as agents want 
them to be: norms of conduct are internal to a network and there is no exter-
nal authority to enforce them. Therefore, reciprocal network relationships 
may elicit free riding and abuse. Enforcement of implicit norms of conduct 
is often difficult and retaliating may be expensive or even impossible. An 
additional disadvantage is that commitment to an established network 
reduces external flexibility, the ability to step out of established relation-
ships and switch to potentially more profitable trading partners, and thereby 
may introduce some degree of rigidity. Network development introduces 
entry and exit barriers. 
5.1 Balancing co-ordination mechanisms 
Vertical co-ordination is called for if market failure troubles exchange 
between a supplier and a buyer in a chain. This vertical co-ordination may be 
more of a formal hierarchical or more of a co-operative network nature. Most 
arrangements found in practice combine features of all three mechanisms 
(see figure 1). There are many forms; one may think for instance of subcon-
tracting, where long-term relationships are usually maintained through 
negotiations rather than competitive bidding. Other examples are franchis-
ing, where a firm down the chain uses a trademark owned by a supplier, and 
alliances, where technology is shared or specific activities are co-ordinated. 
On the one hand, organizations that are engaged in repeated exchanges may 
seek a balance between elements of market and hierarchy. This results in a 
certain degree of redistribution of formal authority and control, taking the 
form of long-term contracts or participations, mostly involving the delega-
tion of some amount of discretionary power to a 'chain manager'. On the 
other hand, organizations may seek a balance between elements of network 
and market exchange, of competition and collaboration, of norm guided 
behaviour and market. The stronger their social ties, the more they move to 
norm co-ordinated behaviour; the weaker their ties, the more they rely on 
market co-ordination. This balancing between norm and market results in a 
certain degree of voluntary co-operation and embeddedness of ties. Embedded-
ness is the extent to which an exchange relationship is rooted in a social 
structure, in a structure of personal ties. Embedded relationships enable not 
only the transfer of material values (goods, services, money), but also 
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facilitate the exchange of knowledge and information and of reassurances, of 
various kinds of signals that build trust. Trustworthiness is an element of 
high value in embedded ties: it decreases transaction costs (costs of search-
ing, bargaining, contracting, monitoring, enforcing) and it provides security 
(the guarantee that one can depend on one's partners in unforeseen circum-
stances). Finally, an integrated vertical relation is characterised by a specific 
mix between formal hierarchy and informal reciprocity, a degree of "author-
itarianism". There is a balance to be accomplished between directing behav-
iour and empowering people, between commands and obedience on the one 
hand and devolution of responsibilities and trust on the other. 
Figure 1 Balancing institutional mechanisms 
Network 
Market 
Embeddedness 
Vertical control 
Authoritarianism 
Hierarchy 
•> Degree of vertical co-ordination 
5-2 What drives vertical integration in supply chains? 
The search for effective and efficient institutional arrangements between 
suppliers and buyers often seems a process of trial and error. Remarkably, we 
currently see how some firms move towards more hierarchical arrangements 
in chains, using ever more elaborate contracts to organize their relationships 
with preferred suppliers, while at the same time structuring their internal 
operations using market mechanisms, for instance by having business units 
trade with each other as independent partners. We also see that business 
relations get ever more formalized through contracts, while at the same time 
an increasing emphasis is put upon informal transaction mechanisms and 
the establishment of generally accepted norms (referred to with terms like 
social accountability, business ethics, licence to produce) to govern transac-
tions between actors in social networks. This raises the question: what are the 
drivers of these changes in institutional arrangements in chains? 
All three types of co-ordination of vertical relationships have their specific 
strengths, weaknesses and costs. A common hypothesis is that the institu-
tional mechanism with the most favourable cost-benefit ratio is likely to 
become the standard in any particular situation. A process of competition or 
of evolutionary selection will take care of weeding out arrangements that are 
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less efficient and more expensive. In relationships where relation-specific 
assets are involved or that are characterised by high uncertainty or informa-
tion asymmetries, one would therefore expect more hierarchy than market 
(Williamson, 1989). This argument is not univocally supported by empirical 
observation: there is a good deal of path dependence and limited rationality 
involved in the choice of institutional arrangements. Also, in cases where 
institutional arrangements lead to unequal exchange, there are vested inter-
ests that will try to conserve the status quo, however inefficient this may 
seem from an aggregate point of view. 
Casual observation suggests, though, that vertical integration is currently 
progressing in many supply chains. Vertical collaborative agreements and 
joint development initiatives seem more prominent than they used to be. 
Also, there is a heightened (public) awareness of norms of commercial behav-
iour and business ethics and this seems to have become more important in 
the conduct of business. This raises the question of what drives this process. 
One factor may be technological change. The relative attractiveness of differ-
ent institutional mechanisms depends partly upon their costs. Technological 
development, especially the continuing development of ICT-applications, not 
only reduces the cost of trading in absolute terms, but also changes the rela-
tive costs of market, hierarchy and social network. The costs of institutional 
arrangements, be they transaction, agency or networking costs, are to a large 
extent costs of gathering and processing information: search costs and mon-
itoring costs. Information gathering, transfer and use has been revolution-
ised by the development of ICT-applications. ICT has lead to more transpar-
ency in markets: product and price information of competing offers is more 
readily available. In addition, ICT has also lead to extended capabilities to 
monitor performance and enforce contracts in a hierarchical relationship. 
Finally, improvements in communication technologies, and in transporta-
tion as well, have made the extension of networks over great distances easier 
and cheaper. On cannot determine a priori which co-ordination mechanisms 
have benefited most from these developments, though. 
Another factor that influences vertical integration may be of a cultural 
nature. Individualization (or de-collectivisation) in society decreases the 
force of norms of behaviour. Globalization extends trade networks far beyond 
the borders of social and cultural groups and renders business relationships 
increasingly anonymous. Agents identify less with the people they entertain 
commercial relationships with and the threat of social expulsion therefore 
becomes less awesome. This drives business partners toward ever more for-
malization of their relationship through elaborate contracts. Also, informal 
norms of conduct are increasingly formalised in regulations and laws. As this 
becomes increasingly costly, this stimulates conscious efforts in social net-
work building and in establishment of shared norms. Efforts to abide by com-
mon norms materialise in a good reputation. Downstream buyers in the 
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chain often face problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. A favoura-
ble reputation may deal with that by reducing the need to monitor and check 
on the part of these buyers. It thereby decreases the cost of trade. Reputation-
building is often helped by developing personal relationships, by transform-
ing anonymous market relationships into a social network. Stable, long-term 
personalized relationships provide a basis for risk sharing and for collabora-
tion in joint development projects. For example, the development of a pre-
ferred supplier relationship, as is common in many supply chains, reduces 
transaction costs and increases commitment, while retaining a considerable 
degree of flexibility. 
An open question is whether firms actually use the choice for particular 
institutional arrangements as instruments in competition. This can be com-
petition between firms in a chain over the distribution of revenue or between 
different chains for their position on consumer markets. The more market 
power a firm has, the more possibilities it has to structure the mechanism of 
exchange to its own benefit. For example, retail firms not just negotiate the 
prices they pay to farmers for fresh products, but increasingly determine the 
conditions under which these prices are set and trade takes place. 
Conclusions 
A central issue in supply chain development is the co-ordination of exchange 
between firms in the chain, such that conflicts of interests are dealt with effi-
ciently and that aggregate chain performance is maximized. Exchange 
between independent agents is mostly co-ordinated through the market. The 
market mechanism, however, performs well under specific conditions and 
these conditions are not always met. If property rights cannot be enforced or 
if information is asymmetrically distributed, the costs of letting the market 
mechanism operate rise to very high levels or the market may fail altogether. 
This happens in cases of asset specificity and where there is a risk of adverse 
selection or moral hazard. In those cases, some degree of vertical co-ordina-
tion may resolve the problems. Increasing vertical coordination implies 
introducing elements of hierarchical co-ordination (authority) and of net-
work co-ordination (the reciprocal mechanism). Vertical co-ordination intro-
duces stability and may resolve conflicts of interest, but it often also reduces 
flexibility and incentives to innovate. Besides, the hierarchical mechanism 
and the social network also have their operating costs; these have to be 
weighed against the transaction costs of the market. Generally, though, there 
seems a tendency toward increasing vertical co-ordination and experimenta-
tion with new forms of vertical arrangements. This is likely to be related to 
technological progress in ICT and to individualization and globalization. 
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